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ELITE ASSOCIATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF 
BELONGING IN CAMEROON 
Francis Nyamnjoh and Michael Rowlands 
Anthropologists of the Manchester school are generally credited with first 
recognising the complexity of the family and kinship ties that bind urban 
migrants to their regions of origin in Africa (Gluckman, 1940; Mitchell, 
1969). Gluckman distanced himself from the structural-functional paradigm 
of conservative 'tribalism' surviving in a modernising town setting by 
stressing that, whatever their origins, 'traditional' urban ethnicities in 
southern Africa were organised as associations for immediate self-help in 
town rather than as extensions of rural ethnic politics. The direction of the 
urban-rural divide was reversed, so that ethnic identities were recognised as 
a cultural fact of town life and not as some remnant of tradition left from 
staying in touch with the village. In West Africa, it has been argued, ethnic 
ties uniting those in town with kin and affines in regions of origin have 
exerted a more positive feedback effect to both reinforce and transform 
traditional identities in the village (e.g. Gugler, 1971). Inventing 'tradition' 
in the village as a means of taking advantage of the political driving force 
emanating from the town has become a recognised feature of urban post- 
colonial history in West Africa. 
In order to understand different processes of urban/regional ethnic 
identification, we shall compare the role of elite associations in two regions 
of Cameroon; one in the Grassfields, characterised by 'chiefly' titles and 
'chiefdoms', the other on the coast (South Western Province), distinguished 
by more diffuse, acephalous polities. We argue that the influence elites exert 
in their home regions depends on the respect they acquire in local politics for 
their knowledge of and influence over external affairs. The central point is 
that the extent to which urban elites will play a significant role in defining a 
regional identity for their home area depends on the resources they bring 
with them and the incentives that encourage them to mobilise local political 
support. To some extent this depends on the number of educated, literate 
adults that exist to represent a particular rural population as well as their 
willingness to remain identified with local interests. Encouraging the young 
to gain an education and go abroad, yet not to forget their debt to those who 
supported them at home in the village, is one of the benchmarks for 
measuring regional progress and development in Cameroon. 
During the era of President Ahidjo, in the 1960s and 1970s, there was 
much less reason for elites to remain attached to their 'village'. The pursuit 
of regional ethnic loyalties was inimical to the authoritarian interests of a 
centralised administration with which elites were encouraged to identify as 
their source of patronage. How people of influence in the 'village' managed 
to keep control of their upwardly mobile elites at that time has been a much 
discussed subject (e.g. Geschiere, 1982). Witchcraft and the need for 
protection against the malice of envious people left behind in the village 
were widely recognised as a fear that secretly bound urbanites to their 
homelands (cf. Geschiere, 1997; Fisiy and Geschiere, 1996). Others attached 
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importance to the village as 'home' or 'place', where it would be unthinkable 
not to be buried. The push and pull between the dependence of elites on the 
central government and their attachment o place produced an ambivalence 
that expressed itself often on the front pages of newspapers. 
Since 1989 such ambivalence has been accentuated in Cameroon by the 
impact of democratisation and liberalisation policies encouraged by political 
conditionalities attached to structural adjustment. A major consequence of 
multi-partyism and the weakening of authoritarian control has been the 
attempt by the ruling party to maintain local support at all costs, principally 
through appropriating the support of elite associations and their representa- 
tives. With the current impasse in multi-party politics encouraging devolved 
regionalist politics, elite associations now play an unprecedented role in 
mediating between people who have grown used to the idea of elections and 
having a vote. The attachment of elections and citizenship to regions 
encourages a more formal distinction of rights based on birth or residence: 
the distinction between autochtones/allogenes or natives and strangers. We 
argue that in the 1990s this has led increasingly to the replacement of 
political parties by ethnicised elite associations as the prime movers in local 
regional politics. Instead of the development of multi-partyism the trend is 
for local regional ethnic politics to compete for 'party' status and access to 
state resources. The inclination of elites at present to identify with their home 
regions is part of this tendency for devolved power to be accompanied by 
increasingly violent polemics about 'ethnic cleansing' and the removal of 
'strangers' who in many cases are second or third-generation descendants of 
migrants. 
ELITE ASSOCIATIONS IN CAMEROON 
Associations of urban-based educated men and women who identify with a 
particular egion or ethnic group are not a new phenomenon in Cameroon or 
elsewhere in West Africa. In the anglophone part of the country Lions clubs, 
school and college associations, Church groups and other fund-raising 
organisations are a long-standing feature of urban life. Associating access to 
education with progress goes back to the very early years of German 
colonisation, when chiefs competed with each other to invite the missions to 
found schools in their villages. Ostensibly it was the responsibility of 
educated elites to help others from the same family and to pass the benefits 
of their success back to their village of origin. In many cases associations 
were founded principally for mutual aid on the basis of having gone to the 
same school or belonged to the same church or lived in the same 
neighbourhood, so that membership would often cross ethnic ties. 
Many of these associations go back to the 1950s and the first major 
expansion of secondary education in Cameroon. Martin Njeuma (1987) 
describes the age group who went through Sasse College (the St Joseph's 
Mill Hill Mission in Soppo) from 1953 to 1958 as a strongly bonded 
association of classmates united by the common struggle to expand 
secondary education in what was then the Nigerian Crown colony. The 
club, which was founded in 1971 by those returning from university 
education in Britain and North America, has a core of anglophone civil 
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servants and academics based in the capital, Yaounde, who call themselves 
'the Recorders' and meet regularly each month. Known to one another as 
'one of the worst bunch of students the college had ever known', the class 
prides itself on its militancy, which led to fundamental changes in the living 
conditions of students and in the college curriculum in the 1950s (Njeuma, 
1987: 6). They pride themselves on having achieved the best examination 
record in the college and on the fact that many, now middle-aged, are in 
senior positions of political and economic power. The members donate funds 
for the development of the college, help each other promote their business 
interests and organise events that support an anglophone identity. The 
organisation is extremely formal, with a written constitution specifying 
financial contributions, the dates of meetings, the hierarchy of officials and 
the contribution and roles of the members. 
The tendency towards bureaucratising functions is characteristic of many 
types of association in Cameroon, ranging from Church groups to rotating 
credit associations as well as businesses. The association of discipline with 
success and achievement is seen by some as an 'anglophone virtue' and by 
others as an inheritance from mission schools run by the 'white fathers'. For 
most of the boys entering the college between the ages of 12 and 16 the 
wearing of uniform, the rigorous timing of the day, which would start with a 
bugle call at 5.30 a.m. and end with 'lights out' at 10.00 p.m., tidiness and 
the arrangement of daily life around predetermined goals were a strikingly 
new routine summed up by the word 'discipline'. 
Apart from the Sasse Old boys' Association, of which the Record Club is a 
part, other active alma mater associations in anglophone Cameroon include 
the Bali Old Boys' Association, the Sacred Heart Ex-students' Association, 
Lourde Ex-students' Association, Saker Baptist Ex-students' Association, 
Okoyong Past Students' Association, St Bede's Ex-students' Association and 
St Augustine Ex-students' Association. Their concerns are similar, and their 
continued existence since the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1990 
depends on members avoiding party political discussion at meetings and 
dwelling on neutral issues such as the marginalisation of anglophones and 
the development of their former college. 
The formal organisation of elite associations reflects the virtues of vertical 
integration, providing the contacts and self-help necessary to gain access to 
resources for local development, and describes the special characteristics of 
ethnic/regional politics in the articulation of state power. For example one of 
the long-standing features of the multi-faceted form of Grassfield 
associations has been their espousal of anglophone politics and identity in 
a predominantly francophone post-colonial state. A post-colonial history of 
exclusion from state power and resources is explained by anglophones as the 
only way francophone Cameroonians can cope with anglophones' obvious 
superiority in all things to do with administration, education and business (cf. 
Konings and Nyamnjoh, 1997; Nyamnjoh, 1996; Gobata, 1993, 1996; The 
Postman, n.d.). The waste and bureaucracy of the francophone way are 
constantly compared with the frugality and efficiency of the anglophone 
heritage. What is termed the 'zero option' (full secession by anglophones 
from the francophone-dominated United Republic of Cameroon) has been 
articulated most vehemently by the older generation of anglophone 
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politicians and civil servants.1 Their marginalisation was poignantly 
illustrated in 1995 when the architects of the unification of the former 
West Cameroon with francophone Cameroon in 1961 (Foncha and Muma) 
travelled with a delegation to New York to request the UN Security Council 
to set the plebiscite aside as illegal and return the former West Cameroon to 
the status of a mandated territory.2 
In a more prosaic mode, the political ambitions of most of the elite 
associations that developed by the 1980s were directed to developing 
cultural programmes to educate the young or develop self-help rather than 
forming political groups (Fodoup, 1997). When he first took over from 
Ahidjo, Biya made several attempts to emphasise the unity of the state over 
'ethnic factionalism' (Biya, 1986), condemning traditionalism and ethnic 
favouritism whilst in practice distributing ministerial favours to garner ethnic 
and regional support (in particular that of his own Beti; Bayart, 1993: 45; 
Kofele-Kale, 1987: Nkwi and Nyamnjoh, 1997: 8-10). Nevertheless, 
through claiming to grant access to national/urban politics, elites could 
exercise power and influence in their 'constituencies' in proportion to the 
resources this brought them. Among the chieftaincies of the Western and 
North Western Provinces, including both anglophone Bamenda and 
francophone Bamileke, elites were frequently accused of conniving with 
chiefs to gain access to traditional titles and rights to land and labour. During 
the 1960s the destruction wrought by the war in the Bamileke chiefdoms 
effectively allowed the educated elites, with state support, to take over many 
of the vacant chiefly titles and reinvent chiefship on administrative/ 
bureaucratic lines. The end of British rule in the Bamenda region saw greater 
continuity in the accession of title holders and greater resistance to what was 
perceived as the usurpation of traditional titles by wealth. Yet the pressure to 
'modernise the chiefdoms' meant that the majority of Fons and clan heads 
were chosen from the educated elites in the expectation that they would 
pursue clear modernising goals. The presence of an illiterate Fon without 
educational qualifications or national contacts was popularly seen as a sign 
of backwardness and lack of development. In the South West Province the 
Grassfields' retention of ritually active chiefs was in itself seen as a 
traditionalising backward step. From the 1950s elites in the south-west had 
played a more open and significant role both in the run-up to independence 
and the union with francophone Cameroon and in the subsequent power 
broking, where they were more concerned with curtailing the influence of 
the Bamenda and Bamileke in national politics than with representing a 
common anglophone view. 
Elite associations have evolved in very different local political settings. As 
in the case of the Record Club, there was much greater awareness in the 
south-west of a modernising project and the role that elites could play in 
developing new business and administrative opportunities. The actual role of 
elites in promoting local interests was often cloaked in the language of 
development. A common aim of the ambitious young in the 1970s and 1980s 
was to gain access through the central administration to capital for business 
ventures at the local level. The straddling of private and public sectors 
became effectively the means by which the resources that had been invested 
over many years in the education and advancement of an evolue was finally 
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returned to the village through the benefits of development gained through 
access to a ministerial budget. The development of a more diverse political, 
administrative and business elite in the south-west, linked with the greater 
economic opportunities offered by the commercial development of the 
plantation economies, contrasts with the need to convert economic or 
political capital into symbolic capital in the Grassfields region as the means 
by which elites could exercise influence at the regional level. The common 
accusation that the latter strategy promoted regionalism and limited 
development and access to the state has an element of truth in it, as witness 
the relative underdevelopment of elite/ethnic associations in the anglophone 
part of the Grassfields. 
In the last two or three years significant changes have occurred in the 
political role of elite associations. The previous pattern has been almost 
inverted. With the pressures of multi-partyism and the rise of oppositional 
politics, the boundaries between state and civil society have become more 
fluid as the fortunes of the state have ebbed and flowed. The tendency in 
recent years for elite associations to reinvent or rework ethnic loyalties as 
part of the political mobilisation of regional support to gain advantage in a 
less organised and predictable arena of state politics has encouraged more 
explicit recognition of the political ambitions of these social movements. 
The trend for local associations to take on increasing political significance 
as a means of representing local interests has also been encouraged by the 
unpopularity of a single-party state that has lost considerable direct local 
influence. Instead of responding to local demands through a mesh of cross- 
cutting associations that harness national resources to local needs, urban 
elites find themselves increasingly representing ethnic regional social 
movements that profess neither national political ambition nor the status 
of a political party yet are sought out by national leaders attempting to 
appropriate their local influence. The motives claimed by elites for pursuing 
these new alliances are the furtherance of local development, the 
maintenance of cultural rights and the assertion of regional identities. In 
the forefront of the movement are members of urban elites, who are often the 
first to call a meeting based on ethnic/regional loyalties. 
The scope of these associations is also more ambitious than were those of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Their networks are often international, linked to 
diaspora communities in Europe and the United States. They are quite likely 
to originate in the diaspora of students and businessmen abroad representing 
the interests of ethnic homelands. The role of the internet in facilitating the 
exchange of information about events in Cameroon means that acts of 
violence against or persecution of minority groups can no longer be 
perpetrated in the silence of remote parts of a little known country. The 
opposition party, the Social Democratic Front, was the first political party to 
set up a web page on Camnet to report political resistance to the Biya 
regime.3 The Bamileke make outstanding use of their web site, with regular 
features on dance, music, business contacts, social events and deaths, linking 
the homeland with Bamileke resident in Europe and the United States. The 
claims that are made to defend local interests, spanning a range of issues 
from conserving the rain forest, land rights, the cultural heritage and 
demands for local museums to preserve regional traditions, demonstrate that 
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'issues' are as likely now to be part of global discourses that are internalised 
as they are to be of 'local' origin. 
ETHNICISATION OF ELITE ASSOCIATIONS 
The mobilisation of regional elites for political purposes has therefore been a 
consistent feature of post-colonial politics in Cameroon. In the 1990s this 
trend has been transformed as elite networks have developed to give political 
expression to fears of exclusion and conflict stemming from the impact of 
political liberalisation. The consolidation of numerous elite groups into 
larger regional blocs has increasingly taken an ethnic tone as claims to 
indigenous origins and hostility to 'strangers' have become part of the 
rhetoric of exclusion. The ethnicisation of elite associations as an alternative 
to multi-partyism helps to maintain authoritarian rule through the 
'traditional' manipulation of local networks. 
However, the historical bases of the different regional blocs that can be 
mobilised are very different. Laakam is an association identified with the 
Bamileke of Western Province, who, although francophone, are generally 
considered ethnically part of the Grassfields and to support the Social 
Democratic Front (SDF), an anglophone party dominated by north- 
westerners. In the face of what was seen as an anglo-Bamileke threat, the 
elites of South Western Province came together to form SWELA (South 
West Elites' Association). Whilst the Grassfielders supported the SDF and a 
two-state federal option for the future of Cameroon, SWELA, concerned to 
confront the growing strength of the SDF, and fearing domination by an 
alliance of francophone Bamileke and anglophone north-westerners, recently 
merged with other francophone coastal elite associations to form Sawa in an 
attempt to unite in support of the CPDM. The francophone/anglophone 
divide is therefore cross-cut by alliances that oppose coastal versus 
Grassfield elites and their supporters. 
Laakam 
It is described in its literature as a socio-cultural association founded to 
preserve and extend Bamileke identity in Cameroon. The name derives from 
the initiation house where young men were placed by their elders for three 
weeks to learn 'Bamileke ways'. The culture house is an icon of the integrity 
of Bamileke identity. This, it is claimed, has been systematically abused 
since colonial times, because the French saw the Bamileke to be a threat and 
insisted on treating them as a political and administrative unit rather than as a 
cultural identity. The events of the Union des populations du Cameroun 
(UPC) rebellion only served to confirm this view, and as a result the 
Bamileke claim they have been consistently denied power and justice in 
post-colonial Cameroon (cf. Kago Lele, 1995). 
In a document given to President Biya on the occasion of his visit to 
Bafoussam in 1991 the president of Laakam accused both the Ahidjo and the 
Biya regimes of deliberately fostering ethnic conflict and prejudice against 
the Bamileke for the purpose of maintaining national unity. The whipping up 
of ethnic hatred against the Bamileke with the rise of multi-party politics, he 
claimed, was to resort to the colonial tactic of promoting tribalism as an 
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excuse to crack down on political opposition in the name of national unity. 
Officials of Laakam claimed that, during the national villes mortes campaign 
of strikes, called by national opposition parties to protest against Biya's 
refusal to consider constitutional change, soldiers stood by whilst crowds 
ransacked Bamileke-owned shops and petrol stations. It is widely believed 
that in protest the Bamileke for the first time sent their money out of the 
country before the devaluation of 1991 when there was a run on the banks 
and Biya begged them to return their funds. During the worst periods of 
opposition party conflict, after the elections in 1992, the president of 
Laakam, Robert Nkamgang, wrote to Cardinal Tumi, copying the letter to 
the presidency, asking him to help organise a national debate to resolve the 
conflict. 
What lies behind much of the urban violence against Bamileke businesses 
is resentment of 'strangers' and the belief that each 'tribe' should have its 
own region and its members should stay there. Following the SDF victory in 
the municipal elections of 1996, the governor of South Western Province, 
Oben Peter Ashu, was quoted as blaming the defeat of the Cameroon 
People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) on the heavy concentration of 
'strangers' in the south-west.4 In Douala after the election there was a mass 
demonstration by 'the Douala youth' in protest at what was perceived as 
Bamileke domination of local councils (Mentan, 1996), especially the 
election of Bamileke 'settlers' as mayor on four of the five councils won by 
the SDF in Douala. Placards with messages like 'Let all tribes vote at their 
place of origin', 'Mayors should be natives', 'Yes to democracy, no to ethnic 
domination' emphasise the growth of regional/ethnic politics associating 
elite associations with particular party loyalties. The threat of 'strangers' and 
the rhetoric of ethnic cleansing not only refer to north-westerners in the 
south-west and Bamileke in Douala but have spread everywhere as a sign of 
indigenous superiority over minorities, supported in particular by CPDM 
activists. In April 1996, at a party meeting in Bamenda, the Fon of Mankon, 
one of the major Fons in the Grassfields and a vice-president of the 
governing party, threatened that 'any stranger unwilling to abide by the 
norms and traditions of the Mankon people will be dealt with appropriately'. 
The principal of Sasse College in Buea has been accused in the Cameroon 
Tribune of setting up a Kom dynasty (Kom is a Grassfield chiefdom, i.e. 
'stranger') in the school, and the Bishop of Buea was condemned for 
appointing secretaries only from his home (Grassfield) village. 
Laakam claims to be non-party and non-political except that it continues a 
long-term struggle against the ethnic prejudice shown towards the Bamileke 
in Cameroon. Able to mobilise the educated elite as well as 'traditional 
chiefs' through their common respect for custom, the leadership of the 
association was and still is committed to pursuing national unity and 
progress without tribalism in exchange for security and political recognition, 
but claims that they have to be achieved through security and strength. 
'Understanding, solidarity and peace' is its clarion call, combined with the 
merits of nurturing a community that is widely recognised for the 
entrepreneurial skills it has pursued in the teeth of colonial and post- 
colonial ethnic prejudice. Attempts by governments to undermine Laakam 
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by sponsoring the creation of parallel associations have failed (Kago Lele, 
1995: 95-6). 
In 1991 a group of Bamileke students in Frankfurt issued the first 
newsletter of a rejuvenated Laakam. For and on behalf of the traditional 
rulers and title holders of the Bamileke people, it was written and produced 
by educated 'youth' studying abroad, to bring to international attention the 
prejudice of the Biya regime against their people. Effectively the new 
Laakam was first promoted in the Bamileke diaspora in Europe and North 
America, ostensibly with the aim of using its international links to expose 
potential genocide at home. Parallels were explicitly drawn with the fate of 
the Jews in the Holocaust. The authorities' indifference to popular prejudice 
against the Bamileke during the villes mortes campaigns in 1991 was cited as 
a sign that the authorities would not be averse to some kind of ethnic 
'scapegoating' to defer popular anger and resentment. Laakam has now 
established branches in Paris and Washington to co-ordinate its activities 
among the Bamileke diaspora in Europe and the United States. The aim is to 
raise funds and to gain political support abroad for the Bamileke cause. 
Laakam has branch associations in France, Holland, Germany and the United 
States which hold regular meetings and via the internet publicise the plight 
of the Bamileke in Cameroon. Its organisation is modelled closely on 
'traditional' Bamileke 'houses' ranked in a strict hierarchy of age and 
succession so that the youngest, best educated and most voluble spokes- 
persons for the association are the most visible at public meetings and of 
lower status, not usually being members of the inner council. Great emphasis 
is placed on transmitting Bamileke culture to 'youth' and preventing 
disaffection from elders and 'traditional ways'. This is effected through 
diaspora links and providing contacts, information and resources for young 
people to travel for educational or business purposes to Europe and North 
America. 
SWELA 
The development of SWELA encouraged the identification of peoples of the 
coast with opposition to what was perceived to be growing external 
hegemony. This play on elite or ethnic labelling of associations used to be 
more important as distinguishing between anglophone and francophone 
Cameroon. Ethnically defined elite associations were not generally 
characteristic of anglophone West Cameroon, where elites defined 
themselves by means of cultural and development associations concerned 
with the welfare of the village. If in 1991 the south-west created SWELA as 
an association defined by region rather than ethnicity, the aim was to 
distance itself from the view of anglophones as a homogeneous community 
where all suffered the same level of marginalisation. Seeing themselves as 
having suffered greater disadvantage than north-westerners in the distribu- 
tion of state power, the south-western elite clearly saw more political capital 
in a regional association than in the promotion of an anglophone identity, 
real or imagined.5 
SWELA was founded by an ex-barrister, A. T. Enaw, in response to the 
rise to national opposition status of the Social Democratic Front as a regional 
Grassfields-based party. It was initiated as a non-party association that would 
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neither pursue political ambitions nor use opposition tactics to dissociate 
itself from the SDF. Instead it planned to combine all the local elite 
associations that had developed in South West Province into a single 
organisation dedicated to raising the consciousness of South West people for 
the development and progress of the province. It published a three-year 
development plan in 1992 and decided to hold annual conferences of its 
members in Kumba. At that time the identity of SWELA was explicitly 
regionalist, federalist, anglophone: anti-centrist and anti-francophone but not 
anti-government. Its principal supporters, men like Nfon Mukete, E. T. Egbe, 
and N. M. Mbile, were all former politicians and prominent businessmen 
resident in the south-west who had a strong personal affiliation with the Biya 
regime. The main branch was founded in Yaounde, with Chief John Agbor 
Tabi as its head. It aimed to achieve regional development and semi- 
autonomy as a pressure group rather than an opposition party. The belief that 
SWELA would alleviate the poverty of the masses in South Western 
Province was justified by the increased freedom to criticise the government, 
in particular through a plethora of ethnic/regional newspapers and journals 
that appeared between 1990 and 1993 (Nyamnjoh, 1996). 
The formation of SWELA as a pressure group was also justified by 
contrast with the chimera of pursuing national power in the wake of Fru Ndi 
and the SDF. Whilst initially a response to fears of SDF dominance in the 
new multi-party politics, SWELA claimed it would support the party that 
best pursued its regional interests. It was after a delegation had met Biya on 
his first visit to Buea, in September 1991, that the association developed the 
case for a ten-state federation that would leave the South West autonomous 
(free from the 'exploitative', 'unscrupulous', 'ungrateful', 'domineering' 
settlers/Grassfielders), effectively undermining support for the two-state 
federation campaigned for by the SDF. It was this perception of 
collaboration between the senior members of the Yaounde branch of 
SWELA and the CPDM that led to major internal disputes in 1993. When the 
government sent gendarmes to South West Province, to stop the smuggling 
of petrol and other goods from Nigeria, some people were killed in the 
market in Tiko and tensions arose among the elite in the Yaound6 branch 
over continued support of the CPDM. An opposition SWELA II was formed 
to support the SDF, led by a journalist from Lebialem division. It held its 
first meeting there in December 1993, whilst SWELA I held its second 
meeting in Kumba in April 1994, with the Prime Minister, Achidi Achu, the 
governor and chiefs of South Western Province in attendance. 
In his address Caven Noko Mbele, the general secretary of SWELA I, 
denounced the aspirations of those who wished to return to a unified 
anglophone province of West Cameroon. He pointed out that SWELA II had 
met in Lebialem, which was widely regarded as a Grassfield province, not 
truly south-west, and that Martin Nkengu, the general secretary of SWELA 
II, was a journalist who often wrote under the pseudonym of Alexi Atangcho 
(the title of a Bafut/Grassfield sub-chief), demonstrating his Grassfield 
loyalties.6 The real interests of the south-west, he claimed, would be served 
only if people freed themselves from anglophone yearnings for a return to 
the conditions of the 1961 plebiscite and by sharing the aspirations of other 
Cameroonians to live within a federal state. The leadership of SWELA I 
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argued that a revival of 'tribal cultures' in the south-west and the reinvention 
of chiefship would win popular support for SWELA and bring maximum 
political pressure to bear on the Biya regime. Instead of the obsession with 
the anglophone identity of the Cameroon Anglophone Movement and the All 
Anglophone Congress (AAC), which would lead only to conflict and 
potentially civil war, SWELA I's programme would realistically serve the 
aspirations of the indigenous people of South Western Province.7 
In September 1993 the chiefs of the South Western Province visited Paul 
Biya in Yaounde and declared, 'we want to register beyond any doubt to 
your Excellency our absolute condemnation of any attempt directly or 
indirectly at partitioning the country on the basis of anglophone or 
francophone culture ...' Chief Endeley was subsequently appointed 
paramount chief of Buea and made responsible for appointing new sub- 
chiefs in the districts that had 'lost' that tradition. Couched in the language 
of self-help, the creation of the Cameroon Rural Construct in Kumba, the 
Fish Co-operative in Limbe and the Obang farms in Manyu were cited as 
examples of the energising force of SWELA in extracting government funds 
for local development. At its meeting in 1994 members were urged to form 
themselves into NGOs, co-operatives and local initiative groups that would 
foster self-help. In the light of what he described as 'the latest friendly 
gesture of the IMF towards our country' (the IMF decision to renew its loan), 
the president of SWELA I declared he would compile a new edition of the 
catalogue of development projects for the south-west to be presented to 
President Biya. 
In February 1996 SWELA merged with the Sawa ('coast', 'frontier' or 
'boundary limits' in Douala) movement to form a united front of coastal/ 
forest peoples powerful enough to thwart all attempts by the Grassfields 
(north-westerners and Bamileke) to 'snatch' power. Associations of Sawa 
chiefs, Sawa elites and Sawa women were formed to fight exploitation by 
'unscrupulous' and 'ungrateful' Grassfielders or 'settlers' and to play up the 
idea that, as minorities, the indigenes of the South West and Littoral 
Provinces needed peace, protection, social order and development, which 
only President Biya and the CPDM could provide.8 The fear of Grassfielders 
among south-westerners originates in the long-standing influx of labour to 
coastal plantations and the success of Bamileke and anglophones from North 
West Province in buying land and taking over prominent businesses in the 
south-west (Kofele-Kale, 1981). Whilst Sawa had emerged as a Douala 
association to confront Bamileke expansion, its interests converged with 
those of SWELA to pressurise a regime that for thirty years had consistently 
denied resources to one part of anglophone Cameroon because it had 
originally been against unification.9 Wider anglophone politics were also 
being reacted against, including the ambitions of the All Anglophone 
Congress movement to opt for separation from francophone Cameroon (the 
zero option) or for two states. The SDF, AAC and North Western politicians 
(e.g. John Foncha, the architect of the union in 1961) argued for a two-state 
federal structure that would recognise the semi-autonomy of anglophone and 
francophone Cameroon within a new federal unity whilst SWELA and most 
South Western politicians wanted a ten-state federation that would preserve 
the separate status of South Western and North Western Provinces. It is with 
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this divide in the anglophone identity that the Biya regime has made 
considerable progress recently in undermining support both for the SDF and 
for the two-state federal option. 
THE EFFECTS OF MULTI-PARTYISM 
The effect of a brief period of multi-party politics has been to erode national 
politics at the local level. The earlier mode of representation through local 
branches of the national political party, the CPDM, has lost considerable 
popular credibility. The major opposition party, the SDF, has extended its 
organisation and acquired support outside its regional base in Bamenda, 
particularly in the west, south-west and Douala regions, but it is not clear 
that the future will be a matter of competing national political parties, 
especially given current disillusion with the ruling and opposition parties 
alike (Ngwane, 1997). Instead elite associations, NGOs and co-operative 
groups and reinvented 'tribal chiefs' have developed as mechanisms for 
articulating national and local politics. Government Ministers suddenly 
appear at meetings of an association or a new co-operative in the South 
Western or North Western Provinces offering to build a road or fund a new 
farming project. A French cultural centre opened in Buea in 1993 just below 
the Mountain Club, where civil servants since the days of the British have 
gone for a drink after work. With its access to satellite television for sport, 
films, documentaries, serials and CNN news, plus a weekly programme of 
imported videos, there is perhaps no more telling a symbol of where the 
conflict lies when articulated in terms of ritualised consumption. 
More worrying has been the evidence of increased conflict and violence, 
particularly in the Grassfields, where old land disputes have flared up and 
there are claims of significant numbers being killed. In June 1995 men from 
the village of Balikumbat attacked Bafanji, burning the centre of the village 
and killing eighteen people. In another dispute, in July, fifty people were 
reported killed by men from Babessi armed with automatic weapons. The 
apparent cause of the violence was a revival of long-standing disputes 
stemming from the past actions of men now in opposition politics, e.g. 'we 
have been deprived of our land because the Hon. S. T. Muna, who was then 
Prime Minister [of former West Cameroon] influenced the courts because of 
a grudge that we supported the Bali Nyonga in 1952 against the Widikums. 
Reports of over 100 deaths in fighting between Bambili and Babanki were 
greeted with comments in the press about warmongering Grassfielders, their 
penchant for fighting over trivia and the consistency of such behaviour with 
their ethnic character. Regardless of the accuracy of the figures, there is a 
tendency to interpret everything in ethnic terms, to use the rhetoric of 'ethnic 
cleansing' in response to problems and to encourage antagonism to 
'strangers' as parasites and 'traitors in the house' (C3, 1994; FES, 1997; 
Jua, 1997). 
Nor is any of this particularly spontaneous grassroots-type anger. The 
hidden hand of CPDM politics is discernible in a number of ways (Mentan, 
1996; Jua, 1997). In May 1995 Prime Minister Achidi Achu founded the 
North West Fons Conference Bureau as an association of chiefs who would 
support the government. The Fons of the major chiefdoms in the Grassfields, 
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who had already formed an association of North Western Fons, refused to 
join, owing to their support for the opposition SDF party. The Fon of 
Mankon, a prominent CPDM supporter, was the only major Fon to join the 
new association, together with the Fons of Balikumbat and Babessi and a 
number of other second-rank chiefs who otherwise had little political clout in 
the Grassfields. The manipulation of ethnic/regional rivalries to divide and 
rule is a long-standing strategy in national politics. The difference in this 
case is the scale and intensity of the violence that has been generated by 
disputes that are themselves routine and unremarkable but have been re- 
energised by the new politics of the 1990s. Much of the violence has been 
perpetrated by gangs from the villages belonging to the CPDM-supported 
North West Fons Conference. In January 1997 Peter Mafany Musonge, the 
Prime Minister appointed from the south-west by Biya, went to the north- 
west and, despite protests from the first-rank Fons, accepted an invitation 
from the North West Fons' Conference to speak at a reception in Bamenda. 
Attributing natural violence to Bamenda men, he continued, 'If we give this 
country to the SDF they will kill everybody in war' (Herald, No. 352). In 
August 1996 the Senior District Officer of Momo division, John Neba 
Nchotu, blamed the Metta for being the architects of their own under- 
development because of their penchant for tribalism. Nchotu lamented that 
the Metta had 'tribalised the local transport business to the extent that non- 
indigenes were prohibited from operating on the road'. The pattern of CPDM 
intervention in Grassfield politics, supporting or encouraging the develop- 
ment of rival elite associations, yet condemning the resulting violence as 
ethnically characteristic, is how multi-party politics operate at the local level. 
The transformation of elite associations into ethnic ones promotes the fear 
that any kind of hybrid will in the end be harmful to the interests of a 
minority. A scramble to indigenise is justified by the need to protect minority 
rights, and what should be the right size of a regional/ethnic bloc becomes an 
issue. In 1996 when the Grand Sawa movement was formed, linking the 
elites of South West, Littoral and Southern Provinces, V. Mukete, a 
prominent businessman and politician from the south-west, justified the need 
for the new association because people were 'being subjected to conditions 
that militate against their progress ... and unless something is done to 
protect their rights as indigenes their extinction will be only a matter of 
time'. If it is regions that have rights they must also be indigenised. In the 
Sawa region most of the chiefly titles are a recent invention, and all meetings 
are accompanied by traditional dances, music and dress that were scarcely 
known ten years ago. In December 1996 the Fon of Bafut announced to a 
group of students visiting the palace that, with German aid, he was arranging 
to have a palace museum created in the former colonial rest house that 
would, among other things, commemorate the victory of the Bafut over the 
Germans in 1891 by putting four of their skulls on display. Standing out 
against these tendencies, the mayor of Buea, speaking in the Baptist chapel 
in April 1997, proclaimed, 'There are no Bakweri or Bamileke or Douala in 
church. Here we are all God's children.' 
A language of ethnicity promotes the fear that any kind of mixture will in 
the end be injurious to the interests of the minority. What is emerging in the 
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late 1990s is regionalism linked with ethnicisation as the key to control of 
resources. 
REGIONAL ETHNIC POLITICS IN THE LATE 1990s 
The victory of the SDF in the municipal elections of 1996 seems to have 
shifted the balance of power significantly towards the opposition parties in 
key cities and towns.10 It is striking how in a little less than two years the 
tables have been turned and the SDF is hemmed in as a regionally based. 
mainly Grassfield party whilst the CPDM has expanded to regain an element 
of legitimacy as a national ruling party. The presidential elections in October 
1997 that brought Biya back with 92-57 per cent of a low vote were 
characterised by avoidance of the main opposition parties. 
Despite threats and talk of non-co-operation with the government, secret 
discussions have gone on to distribute posts and budgets to the major holders 
of regionalised and increasingly ethnicised power. The development of 
regional/ethnic politics has potentially re-established a degree of balance in 
the sharing of state resources that, looking at events in Brazzaville, may have 
been a wise move. It may also be that competition for the presidency is now 
less important than securing a sufficiently large and secure regional ethnic 
base on which to found party-political power. The result of the parliamentary 
elections in May 1997 was to allocate seats to political parties on the basis of 
regional affiliation. The SDF now has most of its parliamentary seats in 
North Western and Western Provinces and elsewhere only where there is a 
significant Grassfield/Bamileke diaspora. The CPDM is the 'real' national 
party, with a predominance of seats in Southern, Central, Eastern, Far North 
and Southern Western Provinces. Its popularity among the indigenes of the 
South Western and Littoral Provinces is surging, thanks to its alliance with 
the Sawa elite. But whether the Sawa movement is a party in the making or 
can keep up its momentum of 1996 without support from the CPDM is hard 
to say, especially as attempts by Sawa elites to create their own parties 
within the democratic process (e.g. the Mouvement progressiviste of Jean- 
Jacques Ekindi of Douala or the Liberal Democratic Alliance of Mola Njoh 
Litumbe of Buea) have failed. In other words, just how possible is it for the 
Sawa movement to remain an active force if the CPDM and the government 
no longer see any need for its allegiance? 
The memorandum from the five Sawa chiefs to Biya after the municipal 
elections in 1996 drew attention to the supposed threat posed to national 
unity by the attitude of 'certain ethnic groups [i.e. Bamileke] bent on flouting 
the spirit of peaceful coexistence among all Cameroonians'. The signatories 
called on the President to enact laws and ordinances aimed at defending and 
protecting minority groups, quoting the country's constitution. The ambition 
of the promoters of Sawa led them to float the idea of the Grand Sawa 
political party stretching from Campo to Mamfe. In response to critics who 
called it a shameless act of political expediency, Ekindi wondered why the 
Sawas were condemned while Laakam of the Bamileke and Essingan, an 
elite association of the Beti, were revered. He vowed, 'This is the time we 
want to assert ourselves and reorganise, and nothing can stop us.'1 Biya's 
appointment of Mussonge, a south-westerner, as Prime Minister, to replace 
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Achidi Achu, an anglophone from the north-west, in September 1996, by 
putting a Bakweri in the top position weakened the anglophone cause as well 
as spelling trouble for Sawa (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 1997: 227-8).12 At a 
Sawa meeting Jean-Jacques Ekindi accused the South West delegation of 
sidetracking him and wanting to dominate the movement. 'Sawas cannot 
complain of Bamileke domination and later accept South West domination.' 
The deterritorialisation implied by recent changes suggests increasing 
Appadurai-like disjunctions-associations that are no longer regional but 
diasporic face regions claiming to define a 'people' by locality and heritage 
rather than adherence to nationhood. The latter in turn conduct a 
contradictory project of reunifying territory and at the same creating 
multiple peoples within it. After the parliamentary elections of 1997, when 
seats were allocated on a regional basis, the CPDM could once more claim to 
be the national party because of its regional support in the Southern, Central 
and Eastern provinces and, through Sawa, among the coastal populations. 
The SDF is the major opposition party but its support is limited to the North 
Western province, the Western province and to Lebialem in South Western 
Province, together with a few other seats where the stranger population is 
high. In future, parties will succeed to the extent to which they can build 
close links with their regions, which will turn party politics into a familiar 
'gate-keeper' role in redistributing state resources and making them flow in 
certain directions. Effectively the failure of the nation state in Cameroon to 
contain and redefine the lives of its citizens is reflected in the expansion of 
informal economies, in the proliferation of NGO-type organisations, in 
bankrupt development projects, local violence and, most worryingly, in the 
transformation of elite associations into ethnic/regional blocs with which 
political parties identify rather than with a central administration. 
CONCLUSION 
Whilst the ties between urban elites and their rural origins have been a 
constant feature of the last three decades, the 1990s have seen a significant 
change in the way in which elite associations have changed from being 
informal and separate from national parties to becoming one of the main 
vehicles of local political mobilisation. 
One result is the promotion of local identities in more complex and cross- 
cutting forms of association. But the definition of the group varies, and 
basically size matters, as does the form of dependence between urban elites 
and rural populations. The comparison between Laakam and SWELA 
illustrates two divergent tendencies. The former is rooted in a long-standing 
ethnic identity that has been opposed to both colonial and post-colonial 
government control and has functioned as a means of maintaining strong 
regional solidarity in the face of threats to economic security and cultural 
survival. The reworking of traditional titles and rights has a complicated 
history that now extends internationally to a diaspora that attempts to 
transcend the particular conditions of the state in Cameroon. 
By contrast the history of SWELA and its transformation into Sawa is a 
reformulation in ethnic terms of the well established strategy of elite support 
of government policies in return for a share of state resources. The mix of 
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managers, businessmen and professionals that made up SWELA owed their 
careers to government support and the continuation of a federal structure. Its 
opportunistic transformation into Sawa already appears to be breaking down. 
The support in South Western Province for the opposition party, the SDF, 
drawn mainly from Grassfield labour on the plantations and unemployed 
urban youth, is the main threat to the cosy relationship between a local elite 
and the Biya regime, especially as the south-west has failed to produce a 
credible party of its own. In the long run, regional politics may emerge that 
conceal urban class conflict in the guise of urban/rural ethnic ties. But that 
would also imply a common tendency in both cases to use ethnic discourse 
in different situations to achieve different goals. 
Laakam and Grassfield chiefdoms in general share certain cultural 
perspectives that are deeply rooted and constitutive of individual practices. 
The overriding concern is with maintaining cultural integrity and identity in 
the belief that any weakening of identity would result in dissolution and 
absorption by powerful outside forces. Resistance to outside interference and 
attempts to negotiate the nature of such relations contrast with the role of 
elites in the south-west, which historically have been more outward and 
inclusive in their external relations. They espouse a more modernising 
discourse, pointing out that the people of the south-west have always been 
more developed economically, more receptive to change, exploiting a 
significant proportion of the country's natural resources. In their different 
ways both discourses sustain an idea of identity that resists incorporation into 
a larger totality whilst differing as regards the degree of exclusion or 
inclusion adopted in practice. 
Analysing the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, Ignatieff (1993: 16) has 
argued that systemic fear arises when a state begins to collapse. Ethnic 
hatred is a result of the terror that is felt when faith in legitimate authority is 
lost. Whilst such an ideal may always have been met with some cynicism in 
Cameroon, if now the state is no longer the provider of public services, and 
is perceived as serving only the interests of one particular group, it must lose 
legitimacy. 
There are enormous pressures in Cameroon to emphasise regional 
autochthony as the basis of political power. Regionalism implies 
indigenisation, encouraged by multi-party politics that are increasingly 
established through localising strategies. Ironically this espousal of the 
politics of decentralisation accompanies a new tendency towards authoritar- 
ianism and one-party rule, depending on which party represents the most 
powerful ethnic-regional bloc at any given time. The movement of urban 
elites to identify with their rural origins also in part subverts the analytical 
distinction drawn by Mamdani (1996) between 'custom' and 'civil society'. 
People move between the two and tend to emphasise the value of either, 
according to their circumstances. In the past this has led to considerable 
ambiguity about origins, depending on the value attached to rural 
connections. The drive to emphasise autochthony and origins now links 
the rural with the urban by creating a base in the village as the legitimation 
for electoral appeals. The lining up of ambitious politicians behind 
customary authorities in the village scarcely promotes rural democratisation 
but acts to subvert urban 'civil society' into familiar forms of ethnically 
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defined patrimonialism. The support of national regimes for local customary 
authority has also become a key issue in the ethnicisation of politics and the 
expression of political competition through identification with regions and 
origins. Whilst the rural-urban distinction is now more fluid than ever, it 
functions to promote the politics of belonging at the expense of reforms 
encouraging both rural and urban participatory 'civil society'. 
NOTES 
See Cameroon Post, No. 192, 1-8 December 1993, pp. 7-10; Cameroon Life 2, No. 10, 
October 1993, pp. 10-16. 2 See Cameroon Post, No. 259, 3-10 July 1995, pp. 1 and 6-7; No. 260, 10-17 July 1995 
p. 5. 3 Ian Fowler, personal communication. 4 See The Herald, No. 279, 29-30 January 1996, p. 3. 
5 See Dickson Eyoh's article in this issue. 
6 For an idea of the 'war of the SWELAs' see Weekly Post 3, No. 0079, 26 January-2 
February 1995, pp. 1-2. 
7See Weekly Post, No. 0069 and No. 0070, of November 1994, for a comprehensive 
account of SWELA I's ten-state federation option. 
8 See 'From SWELA to Sawa' in The Star Headlines 5, No. 37, 26 August 1996, p. 3; 
Impact Tribune, No. 007, April-June 1996, on 'Camerounais de nationalit6 allogene'; 
Cameroun Tribune No. 6037, 14 February 1996, p. 1, on 'Pourquoi la r6volte des Sawa contre 
le SDF'; and The Pilot 1, No. 3, October 1997, pp. 21-3, on 'Grand Sawa n'est pas un 
mouvement des x6nophobes'. 9 See The Oracle, April 1992, p. 35; The Pilot 1, No. 1, December 1996; The Pilot 1, No. 2, 
Mav 1997. 
A victory which the government, however, neutralised by appointing pro-CPDM 
government delegates with full powers to manage council projects and finances (see 
presidential decree No. 96/031 of February 1996). By ensuring the appointment of indigenes as 
delegates in SDF councils in the Sawa area (Limbe, Kumba, Douala) the CPDM government 
was able, even without having won the elections in those cities, to make political capital as the 
party that defended the interests of minorities, thus succeeding, in the eyes of the Sawa 
minority, in presenting SDF as the party for Grassfield (Bamileke/Bamenda) hegemony. 11 See Cameroon Tribune, No. 6121, 18 June 1996; The Herald, 19-21 February 1996. 
12 Shortly after his appointment as Prime Minister, Peter Musonge told the anglophone 
community in Yaound6 to desist from 'self-marginalisation' and to consider themselves as 
fully fledged Cameroonians with the same rights and responsibilities as francophones. At the 
same time, Musonge saw his appointment as the opportunity for south-westerners to 'come 
together to galvanise the second political awakening in the South Western Province' and to 
'strengthen our [the south-westerners'] position and bargaining power'. (See The Herald, No. 
364, 2-3 October 1996, pp. 1 and 3; The Star Headlines 5, No. 40, 20 November 1996, pp. 1 
and 3; Cameroon Tribune, No. 6225, 12 November 1996, pp. 1 and 7-10). 
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ABSTRACT 
The development of elite associations has been a consequence of the growth of 
multi-partyism and the weakening of authoritarian state control in Cameroon in the 
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1990s. The attachment of electoral votes and rights of citizenship to belonging to 
ethnicised regions has encouraged the formal distinction between 'natives' and 
'strangers' in the creation of a politics of belonging. The article argues that this 
development has also led to the replacement of political parties at the local level by 
ethnicised elite associations as prime movers in regional and national politics. 
RESUME 
Le developpement des associations elitaires est l'une des consequences de la 
croissance du pluripartisme et de l'erosion du pouvoir etatique autoritaire au 
Cameroun dans les annees 90. L'attachement des votes electoraux et des droits des 
citoyens a faire partie de regions ethnicisees a encourage la distinction officielle 
entre les "natifs" et les "etrangers" dans la creation d'une politique d'appartenance. 
Cet article suggere que les associations elitaires ethnicisees se sont ainsi substituees 
aux partis politiques au niveau local en tant que force motrice de la politique 
r6gionale et nationale. 
